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Developments in pervasive computing introduced a new world of computing where networked processors 
embedded and distributed in everyday objects communicating with each other over wireless links. 
Computers in such environments work in the background while establishing connections among them 
dynamically and hence will be less visible and intrusive. Such a vision raises questions about how to 
manage issues like privacy, trust and identity in those environments. In this paper, we review the technical 
challenges that face pervasive computing environments in relation to each of these issues. We then present 
a number of security related considerations and use them as a basis for comparison between pervasive and 
traditional computing. We will argue that these considerations pose particular concerns and challenges to 
the design and implementation of pervasive environments which are different to those usually found in 
traditional computing environments. To address these concerns and challenges, further research is needed. 





Privacy, Trust, Identity, Pervasive Computing. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION.  
 
The wide development and integration of sensing, communication and computing have led to the 
development of pervasive computing, which offers the distribution of computational services 
within environments where people live, work or socialise. There are advantages in implementing 
such environments such as, moving interaction with computers out of a person’s central focus and 
into the user’s peripheral attention where they can be used subconsciously. Another advantage of 
pervasive computing environments is to make life more comfortable by providing device mobility 
and a digital infrastructure that has the ability to provide useful services to people in the 
environment, when and where they need them. It is common that a user in these environments 
will maintain various connections with many smart devices regardless of the hardware 
specifications or the software restrictions. Such devices collectively participate in the provision of 
the required service without the conscious or explicit knowledge of the user as stated by Weiser 
[1]. However, at the same time pervasive computing presents many risks and security related 
issues that were not previously encountered in more traditional computing environments. In 
particular, issues such as privacy, trust and identity become more challenging to the designers of 
such environments. Designing secure pervasive environments requires the system to reliably and 
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confidently identify the user who wishes to access the environment’s resources. It is also 
important to appreciate the risks involved in establishing and verifying the identity of users in 
such environments. Privacy is also important as users need to be confident that their personal 
information is not used in a way that they do not approve of. Privacy in such environments is 
particularly important as the system needs to be protective of the users’ data and perceived by the 
user to be that way. Trust within such systems presents another challenge due to the fact that trust 
relationships are much more complex than those normally found in more traditional 
environments. In pervasive environments it is very difficult to define the boundary of trust 
domains, which is important when defining trust relationships. Trust is also important when users 
often cross such boundaries and therefore normal authentication procedures may not be practical. 
This paper reviews the technical advances and challenges with respect to each of these issues 
within pervasive computing.  In section 2, the paper discusses the network access issues in 
pervasive computing and how they differ from those in traditional computing. It presents the 
views of various authors about how accessing the network resources may be handled in pervasive 
computing. The following three sections review previous research related to privacy, trust and 
identity within pervasive computing. In section 7, we provide a comparison that summarises the 
main differences between pervasive computing and more traditional systems in relation to the 
challenges faced in designing secure pervasive computing environments. In section 8, the paper 
provides a number of suggested topics for future research in each of privacy, trust and identity. 
The paper is then concluded by a summary section. 
 
2.  Network Access in Pervasive Computing  
 
In pervasive computing environments, users expect to access resources and services anytime and 
anywhere, leading to different and more serious types of risks. A network inside such 
environments is expected to dynamically connect to other networks and change its topology. For 
example Zugenmaier and Walter [2] stated that when mobile devices join and leave a certain 
mobile zone, and as their wireless short range radio interface goes into and out of range of access 
points or other mobile devices, using a traditional technique such as a firewall will be inadequate 
because a separate firewall is needed to protect each of the devices. They [2] explained that in 
today’s world of networking and computing, there is no problem in protecting systems because 
network resources can be policed using firewalls or intrusion detection systems to separate trusted 
and non-trusted parties. However, in pervasive environments these techniques are unusable and 
unworkable, especially when considering the case of a device stolen or lost.  According to Weiser 
[1], pervasive computing objects can be divided into two main groups:  
 
• Personal devices which are usually carried by individuals, 
• Infrastructure devices which are embedded in the environment. 
 
The interaction between these two categories will define the needs for a new resource access 
model. Therefore Zugenmaier and Walter [2] proposed an ideal state in which the new access 
model will not be achieved by forbidding everything; but by “monitoring, evidence gathering and 
reconciliation”. They discussed how to build a new framework which includes a technical 
security solution, services and rules for good behaviour and ways of dealing with pervasive 
computing security breaches. 
 
User authentication and access control strategies can be used to provide security in small 
networks and stand alone computers. These strategies are used to verify the identity of a person or 
a process in order to enable/restrict the ability to change, use, or view resources. However, the 
wide development and flexibility in distributed networks, such as the Internet and pervasive 
computing environments, show that these strategies are inadequate because such systems lack 
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central control and their users are not all predetermined, leading to serious risks and access 
control problems. Consequently, security is a crucial design issue in pervasive computing 
(because of the usability and expansion of pervasive computing applications) which depends on 
the security and reliability provided by the applications [3]. 
 
In a pervasive environment, there is a strong possibility that people will be monitored by a large 
number of invisible computers in every field of their life, either private or public. The work in [4] 
suggested that the designer of those systems should understand how people can trust such an 
environment and then accept it. Furthermore, pervasive computing systems should consider other 
issues such as privacy, trust, and identity. Because of the wide interaction between the pervasive 
environments and people, privacy becomes particularly important as people learn about the 
existence of such systems and become protective of their own privacy. This is because they do 
not know how their personal data is being collected and what the purpose behind this is. 
Therefore, many researchers suggest different ways to protect the users’ privacy, such as 
anonymity, and giving the right to users to choose whether to distribute and exchange their 
personal data or not. Whenever a user trusts a system, he/she will be more inclined to reveal their 
personal data. Because of the dynamic connections between the device and user, the user will 
depend on the trust relationship agreed between them. Establishing user identity in pervasive 
computing environments requires special attention because using the traditional techniques will 
be insufficient to establish and verify the identity of users. This is due to the mobility of devices 
and the random connection between them and users. Thus, providing a method to verify the real 
identity of a user will be necessary for the success of such an environment. Moreover, it is 
important to note that pervasive computing environments require a new type of authentication 
(authentication of artefacts), which means a physical artefact has to prove that it knows a secret, 
in addition to the need for other traditional types of authentication as stated by Bussard and 
Roudier [5]. 
 
3. Privacy in Pervasive Computing 
 
In pervasive computing environments, where the concentrations of ‘invisible’ computing devices 
are continuously gathering personal data and deriving user context, the user should rightly be 
concerned with their privacy.  Devices may reveal and exchange personal information (such as 
identity, preferences, role, etc) between smart artefacts in pervasive systems. In a context where 
devices cannot be assumed to belong to a single trusted domain, privacy becomes a major issue. It 
is crucial to develop and create privacy-sensitive services in pervasive computing systems to 
maximize the real benefit of such technologies and reduce feasible and actual risks. Because such 
systems collect a huge amount of personal information (such as e-mail address, location, 
shopping history... etc) and because people are typically concerned about their personal 
information, it is conceivable that they will be reluctant to participate in pervasive environments.  
Thus, it is paramount to provide a mechanism that ensures privacy is maintained at all times.  
Privacy can be defined, according to Steffen et al. [6], as “an entity’s ability to control the 
availability and exposure of information about itself”. In [7], the authors identify five 
characteristics that make such systems very different from today’s data collection systems, which 
are:   
 
1. new coverage of smart environments and objects will be presented everywhere in our life; 
2. data collection will be invisible and unnoticeable; 
3. the collected data will be more intimate than ever before; for example how people feel 
while doing something; 
4. the underlying motivation behind the data collection; 
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5. the increasing interconnectivity which is necessary for smart devices to cooperate in order 
to provide a service to users; this results in a new level of data sharing making unwanted 
information flows much more possible.  
 
Together, these characteristics indicate that data collection in the age of pervasive computing is 
not only a quantitative change from today, but also a qualitative change. Users in pervasive 
computing environments do not know what is done with their personal information and a service 
may store or process the provided data in some way that is not intended by the user. This fear 
makes people feel more concerned about their privacy.  
 
Research presented in [8] showed that over the past years, a range of various websites like social 
networking services and photo and video sharing services, put a demand for users to share their 
information with each other. When using such services, users demand control over the conditions 
under which their information is shared. The research found that more complex privacy setting 
types can lead to more sharing. For example, Facebook started to head to more complex privacy-
setting types. This suggested that offering comfortable and flexible privacy settings could make 
services more valuable. The work presented a three-week study in which locations of 27 
participants have been tracked and participants were asked to rate when, where and with whom 
they would be comfortable to share their locations. The research studied location-privacy 
preferences according to the case study. When a participant visited a location, they were asked 
whether or not he/she is willing to share this information with each of four different groups: close 
friends and family, Facebook friends, the university community and advertisers.  
 
As Weiser [1] noted, “If the computational system is invisible as well as extensive, it becomes 
hard to know what is controlling what, what is connected to what, where information is flowing, 
how it is being used and what are the consequences of any given action”. Then he [1] referred to 
privacy as a solution research issue; it has always been raised as a crucial issue for the long-term 
success of pervasive computing. The concept of privacy has become one of the main concerns as 
the technology of smart artefacts develops. Moreover, in the developed world there has also been 
a growing awareness of privacy issues in general, particularly due to the increased use of the 
World Wide Web. Weiser [1] stated that a well-designed pervasive system should eliminate the 
need for giving out some items of personal information. For example, schemes based on "digital 
pseudonyms” could eliminate the need to give out items of personal information that are routinely 
entrusted to the network’s today, such as a credit card number and an address. Langheinrich [9] 
stated “Everything we say, do, or even feel, could be digitized, stored, and retrieved anytime later. 
We may not (yet) be able to tap into our thoughts, but all other recording capabilities might make 
more than up for that lack of data.” The author formulated six principles for directing system 
design based on a set of fair information practices common in most privacy legislation. The 
principles are: Notice, Choice and Consent, Proximity and Locality, Anonymity and 
Pseudonymity, Security and Access and Recourse. In another publication, Langheinrich [10] 
considered designing a perfect mechanism for protecting privacy would be difficult to achieve.  
Therefore he proposed a system where the users are allowed to be alerted about their privacy. The 
system relies on social and legal principles from real life, instead of designing a system to ask 
other people to respect the user’s privacy. This system, named privacy awareness system (pawS), 
permits data collectors to process personal data and management policies, and to describe tools 
for manipulation of personal information (storing, deleting and modifying information). In the 
main, this system is based on four of the above six principles: (notice, choice and consent, 
proximity and locality, and access and recourse), while the other two principles (Anonymity and 
Pseudonymity, and Security) are useful tools and a supportive part of the infrastructure. The 
developed pawS architecture (Privacy Preferences Project P3P) includes two main parts: privacy 
proxies and a privacy-aware database. 
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1. Privacy proxies: In P3P, privacy proxies permit the automated exchange and update of both 
privacy policies and user data. It is implemented as a group of services using Simple Object 
Access Protocol (SOAP), running on a web server. As an example, a user wishes to access 
a specific service (print service or location tracking by video camera) where some personal 
information is required by the service to provide its function. The service will then contact 
the service proxy who provides a list of the available platforms, the different levels of 
services and the required data for each level. The P3P allows users to set their own personal 
privacy preferences and reply with the required information. When the communication is 
successful, the service proxy replies with an agreement ID which is reserved by the user 
proxy for reference. This ID can be used by the user at any time to authenticate him/her and 
find, update or delete any personal information, using HTTP over SSL to prevent 
eavesdropping. 
 
2. Privacy-aware database (called pawDB): This combines the users’ collected data elements 
and their privacy policies into a single component of storage which then handles the data 
according to its usage policy. It uses the following algorithm: 
 
i. first the (P3P) policies, which describe why the data is collected, are imported into 
relational tables using XML-DBMS and are assigned a reference number;  
ii. using the API, the data will be inserted into the pawDB; 
iii. the system compares the submitted data with its privacy policy governing it and 
transparently stores all the data and their privacy policy together; 
iv. to query any of the stored data, the user should describe what they are, the purpose of 
their query and for how long they will keep their information; 
v. pawDB compares each query and its usage policy with the data collection policy of 
each individual element and transparently withholds a particular piece of information in 
case of a mismatch between the two. 
 
According to the above, pawS is a personal privacy assistant which keeps track of the collected 
data with and without the user’s help. It assists users to enable or disable a service depending on 
their preference. To protect users’ privacy, many researchers suggest Anonymity which means 
personal identity or personally identifiable information (of a person) is unknown; in other words, 
the user uses the system without any identification or identifier that distinguishes them from other 
users. Zugenmaier et al. [11] introduced a new attacker model, called the Freiburg Privacy 













Figure1. The privacy diamond model [12] 
 
This FPD model enables an analyser to adjust the “strength of the attacker in a fine grained way 
detailed and dependent on the computing environment”. It can be used to understand the issues 
affecting anonymity in a communications environment. Their model uses four types of entities to 
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characterise information about anonymity, which are: the performed action, the device used for 
performing the action, the user who performs the action and the location of the device and the 
user, as shown in Figure 1. The authors described how these entities are related to each other and 
how an attacker can use familiarity with these entities including relationships among them to 
break anonymity.  
 
Zugenmaier and Hohl [12]  used the  FPD Model to analyse various mechanisms for ensuring 
anonymity in pervasive computing and highlighted the problems that arose out of a model called 
“the one user many devices model”. So, an extended privacy diamond was introduced, which may 
be used to examine if a user is anonymous when using more than one device per user. The results 
of the single FPD model are transferred to the extended privacy diamond. 
 
Hajime et al. [13] showed that because any entity (object/person) in IT systems has a fixed 
identifier (ID) such as radio frequency identifier (RFID), which can be used for identifying 
someone, there is a possibility that revelation (disclosure) of a fixed ID will cause privacy 
problems. So, they proposed a method called “identity control” to conceal a fixed ID during 
transmission times and set the level of switching to reveal the real name and pseudonym from the 
anonym according to the authority of the receiver and the wishes of the sender. Moreover, 
according to this method the real name of the sender is changed into a pseudonym, and the 
pseudonym is changed into an anonym using encryption. Then the receiver can either decrypt the 
received anonym to real name or pseudonym, or use it as is. The authors claim that the sender can 
control the way real names and pseudonyms are deciphered (by the receiver) by changing the 
encryption key. This way, the sender can conceal job-related information from a particular 
receiver by making limited key information available to them.  
 
Chatfield and Hexel [14] studied user identity and privacy in smart environments, and suggested a 
possible solution to the management of user identity and maintenance of user privacy within such 
environments. They also described the concept of “User Selected Pseudonyms”, as a possible 
solution to identity management in intelligent environments. It is a method for allowing users to 
manage their identity in pervasive computing environments, by granting them control (either 
directly or through privacy preferences) to decide what information about themselves they share 
with an environment. They used this method to allow users to control the risks to their privacy 
and give them confidence to utilise the services provided by these environments while 
maintaining the same anonymity currently enjoyed without them. The main idea behind this 
method was that, when users enter a smart environment, they have the option of providing the 
environment with a previously used pseudonym (or history of interaction) using their handheld 
device, to create a new pseudonym or to remain anonymous. Users can keep many different 
environmental pseudonyms, allowing them to effectively choose their required level of 
anonymity at any given time. This choice allows users flexibility in using these environments as 
they wish, allowing them to restrict sharing information about themselves to situations when a 
reason is given to do so. This transparency allows users more control over their privacy, and 
potentially greater confidence when interacting with these environments. In addition, Alfred and 
Jörg [15] identified the privacy benefits of using pseudonyms within adaptive systems, and 
suggested that users can be allowed to adopt multiple pseudonyms to improve their privacy. This 
research examined users’ interactions with intelligent environments, and sought to identify an 
interaction technique to improve users’ experience within such environments in relation to 
privacy and confidence. Allowing users to be anonymous in smart environments and improve 
their privacy can make system adaptability much less effective. Using pseudonyms has been 
identified as a method of allowing users to use adaptive systems, while maintaining some 
anonymity. The research also proposed an architecture for privacy and security which allows 
users to benefit from personalisation while hiding their identities. They referred to it as a 
reference model for pseudonymous and secure user modelling. It included a permissions server 
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for role based access control, a way for hiding users’ identity, modelling servers, secure transport, 
a certificate directory, and a reference monitor that controls the access of clients to user models 
located in the user modelling server. 
 
Privacy protection remains a serious barrier to the widespread deployment of Pervasive 
Computing environments. Researchers are considering identifying applications and seeking ways 
for creating interactions that are effective in helping end-users manage their privacy in pervasive 
computing. Jason and James [16] developed a toolkit (called Confab) for helping the development 
of privacy-sensitive pervasive computing applications. It provides basic support for building 
pervasive computing applications, a framework and several customizable privacy mechanisms. In 
this framework all the personal information of a user will be captured, stored and processed on 
the user’s computer as much as possible, and then the user can control what information to share 
with others. They focused on authorising people with choice and informed permission, so that 
they can share the right information with the right people and services in the right situations. A 
number of researchers have worked on another aspect related to privacy, which concerns 
monitoring users’ behaviour. Within pervasive computing, monitoring capabilities can be 
intrusive because there are sensors and machines which take over the role of the watchers and 
begin to store more and more aspects of our daily routine. Because it is difficult to know when 
people become conscious that they have been monitored and their privacy has been violated, 
Langheinrich [17] described an approach called privacy boundaries. This approach tries to 
capture the various reasons a certain flow of personal information is perceived threatening, and 
then assesses how pervasive computing affects it. The authors also tried to identify and motivate 
key concepts in personal privacy that should influence the “design and implementation of 
privacy-aware pervasive computing systems, which are the systems that take the social fabric of 
everyday life into account and try to prevent unintended personal border crossings”. For example, 
Rhodes [18] presented the wearable memory amplifier, allowing its wearer to continuously record 
events of their daily life (multimedia diary), which helps them to remember a lot of small details 
to provide a useful service. There is, however, a cost in increasing the risk at the privacy 
boundaries. 
 
Another piece of information that is considered sensitive and related to privacy is the user’s 
location information. Hengartner, U., & Steenkiste [19] viewed location information as a 
sensitive piece of information that should not be disclosed to anyone. They analyzed some 
requirements for location policies and implemented an access control system that supports 
flexible location policies, by allowing people to specify their location policy which states who 
should be allowed to locate them. They implemented a prototype that supports two-fold policy; 
user policy and room policy. In user policy, the user can state only a building name to be returned 
and in room policy, the number of people in a location can be returned instead of their identity. 
Moreover, users can specify their own policies by issuing appropriate digital certificates (used to 
express their location policy) using a central authority. Also people can choose to share the right 
information with the right people and service in the right situation. 
 
The work in [20] presented multiple techniques for personal privacy management in pervasive 
sensor networks. It provided a user-centric privacy protected platform for the deployment of an 
invasive sensor network. The study also evaluated the usability of an active privacy badge system 
and the likelihood of using this system as a building-wide privacy protection facility. Throughout 
the research, results showed that an active badge system for privacy control is the most acceptable 
method among all the tested choices (disabling data transmission from an active badge system, 
on/off switches, or the touch screen displays). The results from tests also suggested that if 
residents of moderately denser buildings block data transmission, the availability of the sensor 
network will be compromised. Consequently, it is vital to discover a balance between protecting 
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privacy and maintaining enough data flow for the value-added applications employing the 
network at the same time. 
 
As discussed in this section, many researchers focused their effort towards providing technical 
solutions to address the privacy concerns which have become more acute in pervasive computing 
environments compared to traditional computing systems. In such environments, users interact 
with the surrounding digital devices and have an appreciation of the fact that their personal 
information is being acquired and revealed to these devices. However, they are unaware where 
and when this information is collected and how such devices acquire and use it. This situation 
introduces requirements for users to trust such environments and for clear policies for the 
exchange of such information to be defined. For example, policies enable the users to keep their 
information in a secure place without saving any copy of their information in any place. Along 
with articles covering privacy aspects, we believe that future research will continue this 
development in providing privacy protection in the physical sensor layer for other forms of 
personal contextual information. In order to build pervasive computing systems that will be 
considerate to the privacy of individual users, it is necessary to recognize when people feel their 
privacy has been invaded. 
 
4. Trust in Pervasive Computing 
 
Trust is a vital component in both traditional and pervasive computing environments. It can be 
defined according to Grandison and Sloman  [21] as a “relationship between two entities; trustor 
(the subject that trusts a target entity) and trustee (the entity that is trusted)”. In this section we 
review research and discuss various methods used to solve the problem of trust in pervasive 
computing environments. In pervasive environments a large amount of personal information will 
be collected and as a result of this, many people will not engage in such environments because 
they do not like to be tracked.  According to this, Wagealla et al. [22] used trust to protect users’ 
privacy based on trustworthy information received and by allowing users to decide the amount of 
information that can be disclosed to them. Their approach relied on dividing users into 
information owners (users who are tracked) and information receivers (users who like to use the 
sensed location information). Information owners can therefore specify their own policy in 
recognition of the fact that people have different attitudes towards their privacy. Access to 
information is controlled by the information owner, which is expressed in terms of the 
trustworthiness of the information receivers. The researchers concluded that the privacy of 
information depends on the level of trust between the information owners and information 
receivers. The authors introduced a trust-based security model for the collaboration between 
devices within pervasive computing environments. The model ensures secure interaction between 
smart devices and services, by addressing the concerns of security and trust. In their work, they 
identified two security problems in collaborative environments of smart artefacts:  
 
• ensuring the accuracy of personal information, and  
• establishing trust between personal and public artefacts to support collaborative tasks 
 
Moreover, the two main sources of trust information (about an entity) are personal observation of 
the entity behaviour and the recommendation from trusted third parties. The trust information of a 
particular entity may be stored as historical data. Then, its trustworthiness is assessed before 
deciding to interact with another entity when risk assessment is undertaken. The results of the risk 
assessment are change depending on how much is known about the entity’s actions in the past. 
Research presented in [23][24] and [25] suggested a way to increase security by the addition of 
trust, which is similar to the way security is handled in human societies. They argued that a chain 
of trust will allow greater flexibility in designing policies and providing more control over 
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accessing services and information in pervasive computing. The proposed solution by Kagal et al. 
[24] [25] was based on developing a framework called “Centaurus” to create Smart Spaces which 
includes a message-based transport protocol that is designed to do well in low-bandwidth 
networks. They based their work on a smart office scenario where a mobile user can access all the 
existing resources via a handheld device connected over a short-range Bluetooth wireless 
connection. The solution uses a distributed trust architecture which has the following features: 
 
1. develop and clearly state a security policy; 
2. assign credentials to the users and devices (entities); 
3. delegate trust to a trusted third party (TTP); 
4. give the right to each entity to reason about the user’s access rights, which are dynamic; 
5. check the credentials of an initiator which should fulfil the policies in order to provide an 
access control.  
 
The idea is that some authorized person has the right to delegate the use of services in a smart 
space to another user for a period of time during which the authorized person is in the space. The 
other user can also give the delegation to yet another user so a chain of delegation will be 
established. When any user fails to meet the demands associated with a delegated right, the chain 
will be broken. As a result, no user will be able to do any other action associated with the right. 
Moreover, the authorized person can perform delegation and revocation in this architecture. In 
addition, the researchers used trusted XML signatures instead of using X.509 certificates to 
protect the user’s privacy who do not want to log into the systems using their names. A user, who 
wants to access a service, should first submit their credentials to the security agent which will be 
responsible for generating the authorization certificate. The user can then use the certificate as a 
ticket to access specified services or delegate the access to other users. Kagal et al. [24] attempted 
to solve the problem of access control by using trust, rights and delegation; therefore they 
developed a flexible scheme of trust used for modelling the permissions and delegations. They 
considered permissions as the right of an agent and connected rights with actions and according to 
this the corresponding agent can do a specific action. These permissions can then be extended by 
delegation from an authorized agent. The authors stated that there is a difference between 
centralized and distributed systems in authorization. They explained that although there are many 
different schemes of decentralization (e.g. Access control list ACL and Role-based access control 
RBAC) which are useful, these are insufficient in providing a design for trust management. 
According to them, secure systems in general should not only authenticate users, they should also 
permit users to delegate their rights to other users securely and have a flexible mechanism for 
controlling this delegation. They claimed that the majority of delegation schemes partially address 
the issues related to authentication and delegation combined, while others only support 
authentication, ignoring delegation altogether. There are some schemes that support delegation to 
some level without providing the flexibility needed, while others do not provide sufficient 
restrictions on delegation of rights. If a user has sufficient access rights to use a particular 
resource, then they should have the power to delegate some or all of these rights to others. This 
should be defined in a security policy, which restricts which rights may be delegated by which 
agents and to whom. Privileges can be given to trusted agents, who are responsible for the actions 
of the agents to whom they subsequently delegate the privileges. So, agents will only delegate to 
agents that they trust. In the work presented in [26], while trust relationships are usually based on 
identity, they aimed to define a trust model that is capable of modelling scenarios where identity 
may not be available, yet the context of the scenario is more correctly used in establishing trust 
relationships. The designed model provides a formal basis for making trust decisions. Examples 
of such systems include most traditional authentication systems, where trust is established using 
shared secrets, public/private methods and certificates. They argued the needs for a unified model 
of trust between entities (people and devices), which has the ability to capture the requirements of 
the traditional computing world and pervasive computing world. In the traditional computing 
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world, trust is established based on identity, whereas in pervasive computing it is based on 
identity, physical context or both. Therefore, the authors presented a novel attribute vector 
calculus which has the ability of modelling trust relationships between entities. The main reason 
for using such a vector is because it can capture both the context-based and identity-based trust 
relationships in a simple approach.  
 
The authors in [27] proposed a new trust evaluation model based on the user’s past and present 
behaviour and linked it to a light weight authentication key agreement protocol. They aimed to 
establish an intermediate phase that evaluates the trustworthiness of connected entities before the 
service provision phase allows access to resources in smart environments. Their proposed scheme 
will preserve the user’s privacy because it will use non-sensitive information in the evaluation 
process. They claimed that trust evaluation models are required in smart environments to provide 
secure yet more flexible environments. Figure 2 shows the trust model architecture, in which 
judgment is computed based on the reports of experience messages. The indirect trust is achieved 
by multiplicative relation between judgment and recommendation values given by 
recommendation messages. In addition, the direct trust is determined through a risk assessment 
based on a number of positive and negative actions. The final part is the net trust which is a linear 
combination of both direct and indirect trusts. When the trust values expired, the trust updates 





Figure 2 the proposed trust model architecture [27] 
 
From the above review, it can be concluded that there are different ways to establish trust in 
pervasive computing systems for secure communication among entities. Some authors used 
context information to allow users to specify their policies depending on the level of mutual trust 
between two entities. Others proposed alternative approaches from the human and social sciences 
to distribute trust, where a chain of trust will offer more flexibility in designing policies in 
pervasive environments. Furthermore, other authors used delegation schemes to provide an access 
control from an authorized user to another user for a specific period of time. It is evident from the 
above discussion that pervasive environments require more flexible and dynamic models for 
defining trust relationships. They also require distributed architectures that are capable of forming 
and maintaining such relationships. 
 
5. Identity in Pervasive Computing 
 
Modern computer systems provide services to multiple users and require the ability to securely 
identify (authenticate) the users requesting the services. Identifying users is an important step in 
providing any service, yet it raises a number of issues. For instance, in the case of using Plain 
Password-based authentication, the password sent across the networks can be intercepted and 
later used by eavesdroppers to pose as the user, making it unsuitable for use on computer 
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networks, hence the use of encrypted passwords. In addition to the eavesdropping concern, 
password based authentication is not always convenient; users do not want to enter passwords 
each time they access a service on the network. This has led to the use of a weaker authentication 
on computer networks. To overcome these problems a number of systems use stronger 
authentication methods based on cryptography. When using authentication based cryptography, 
an attacker listening on the network gains no information that would enable them to falsely claim 
another person's identity. As authentication provides verification of identity and ensures that the 
identity declared is really the true identity. This is crucial in enabling access to the right parties. 
However, it does not describe the privileges entry processes. For instance, a user is authenticated 
before accessing a database system, but this does not tell the database system which data the user 
is allowed to access.  As we move into the world of pervasive computing, there is an increased 
transparent interaction between people and smart devices which have computing power. Each 
entity (user or device) in such environments is continually interacting with hundreds of nearby 
wireless interconnected computers. As a result, this means that the common security approaches 
are insufficient to guarantee proper authentication with these entities. Bussard and Roudier [5] 
pointed out that it is more crucial to “authenticate artefacts” in order to protect the artefact or 
entity from any possible attack and ensure that these entities are not faked. They concentrated on 
the authentication of an artefact, which is based on a dedicated challenge-response protocol and 
merged it with standard security mechanisms to prove that an artefact has some privileges; this is 
called “local proof of knowledge protocol”. They also stated that the verification of an artefact, 
which knows a secret, can be done by ensuring that it cannot communicate with other devices 
during the challenge-response. The proposed solution is based on dedicated hardware to ensure 
quick two-bit message exchange and to circumvent an attack; thus eliminating the need for 
cryptography algorithms. Moreover they presented a possible attack such as Man-In-the-Middle 
(MiM) attack to test this solution. They explained how a user can verify that an artefact knows a 
specified secret based on simple Local Proof Boolean challenge-response protocol and a trusted 
third party that can provide an evidence for that artefact that it has the required rights. 
Furthermore a time-based solution (based on Round Trip Time measurement) was proposed 
based on hardware architecture, where exchanging messages between the user and the artefacts 
takes place at the physical layer.  
 
Al-Muhtadi et al. [28] used context and location information based on encryption to achieve their 
main goal which is finding an efficient authorization mechanism. They developed a distributed 
middleware called ‘Gaia’, which can be run on top of existing operating systems in order to 
provide a basic structure (substructure) and central services for fabricating a general purpose 
pervasive computing environment. The researchers developed a framework that provides efficient 
key management for ‘secure group communication’ based on defining context. The framework is 
based on two-layer encryption, one for group membership and the other for location information. 
The two layers use the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128-bit and 256-bit crypto 
algorithm. The purpose of these layers is to forbid an unauthorized device to eavesdrop or spy on 
an event when it is not in the target region. The researchers defined the target region as “spatial 
region and corresponding files created by an administrator or an authorized entity, so that only 
users located within that region can read these files”. Using these layers, a device, that is 
authorized but not located within the target region, will be unable to penetrate the outer 
encryption layer. In such a scheme, the second layer (location encryption layer) is stripped only 
after an entity’s location has been confirmed. Therefore, a group member who leaves the active 
space is unable to decrypt the data with its group key because of the existence of the location 
encryption layer. Hence, re-keying of the remaining group members is not essential. When an 
entity’s permissions are changed, only the keys for the affected levels are revoked. In such a case 
the re-keying includes producing a new group key and then distributing this key to that level or 
group. In [29] authors  used Gaia to provide the necessary core services to support and manage 
active spaces and the pervasive applications that run within these spaces. By using Gaia, it is 
International Journal of Distributed and Parallel Systems (IJDPS) Vol.3, No.3, May 2012 
208 
 
possible to construct an active space where authors incorporate a number of authentication 
mechanisms; each mechanism attains a specific value known as the ‘confidence value’. This 
value ranges from 0 to 1 depending on the device and protocol used in the authentication process. 
In order to increase the confidence value, a specific authentication mechanism may include any 
number of authentication processes. Reasoning techniques are used to formulate the net 
confidence value from the partial confidence values. This authentication provides a unique feature 
which decouples the authentication procedures and authentication devices into two sections. The 
first is an Authentication Mechanism Module (AMM) encompasses all the authentication 
procedures available such as challenge-response, Kerberos, SESAME, etc.. The second is an 
Authentication Device Module (ADM), which is device-dependent, is used for each 
authentication device such as PDA, smart badge, etc. This decoupling facilitates the incorporation 
of a new protocol in the AMM section or a new module in the ADM section for a new 
authentication device without interacting with the other section.  
 
Lee et al. [30] described a process for distributing the key which requires each individual entity in 
a group to re-authenticate itself before receiving a new key. The process of re-authenticating 
checks and ensures the authenticity of the authorization method and hence adds an overhead to 
the management entity. This is compared to the multi-layer encryption method that was presented 
in [29], which eliminates the requirement for re-authenticating entities within a group when a 
contextual change causes changes to the permissions of the group.  
 
Seigneur et al. [31] claimed that entity recognition is more universal than authentication schemes 
and pervasive computing environments can make use of this approach. They based their claim on 
the fact that devices in pervasive computing environments have the ability to connect to systems 
on a point to point basis, control each other and become aware when connecting to each other and 
exchange information among them. They claimed that the recognition of previous interaction to 
choose whether to co-operate or not, is more important than the Identity. They believed that using 
an entity recognition approach is better than using the traditional authentication approaches such 
as Kerberos, PKI, etc, because entity recognition strategies do not always need a human interface 
phase, but may need a process to raise awareness of the surrounding entities depending on their 
estimated importance. Therefore, they proposed an approach called “pluggable recognition 
module (PRM)“ which is compatible with authentication approaches and is pluggable to allow 
various applications to choose different schemes to identify collaborator (partners). Moreover, 
they showed that instead of knowing “whom does this entity represent”, we should know “can we 
recognize that entity as a trusted collaborator regardless of whichever it represents”. Thus they 
introduced virtual pseudonymity (which means no need for distinguished names) and therefore 
they did not require the ability to establish the real identity of a given entity. Instead, they simply 
required the ability to recognise other entities, e.g. through their name, location, digital signatures 
or other means. Furthermore, they tried to limit the human interface in the smart environment by 
using their approach instead of using the authentication schemes. They also identified many 
requirements for their design. For example, they identified that to recognize an entity there must 
be no demand for on-line interaction with a central host. This scheme may also rely on third-
parties to achieve higher scalability. 
 
Stajano[32][33] presented a security policy model called “Resurrecting Duckling model” which is 
an example of entity recognition, in which the main idea is that a Slave device can pose to be a 
Master by the transfer of an imprinting key. This model describes the properties that a system 
should possess to implement a satisfactory secure transient association using imprinting to 
establish a shared secret. They applied their duckling model to a typical scenario to identify and 
pair a remote control unit with a single user, yet retain a certain amount of flexibility. When a 
user has a universal remote control unit to control different devices at home, the user needs to 
ensure that the device will obey their commands, not those of a neighbour’s. Also, when a device 
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breaks down, the user needs to retain control of the other devices. The model is based on the 
scenario of a duckling (device) which identifies and fallows its mother (a user) as the first entity 
which sends a learning process key or imprinting key (a duckling identifies the first moving entity 
it sees and hears as its mother). However, what would happen when the duckling (device) dies or 
breaks down? According to the Resurrecting Duckling model, a duckling that dies can become 
alive again (resurrected) later with a different soul. The authors treated the device as the body and 
the shared secret (software) like a soul. Only the owner has the authority to end the Duckling’s 
life, which will return to its pre-birth status and can accept a new imprinting key. Moreover, if the 
damage was un-repairable, the manufacturer (who has the master password) has the right to 
command the device to die. To achieve this goal the researchers showed that the devices should 
be designed based on tamper resistance that will help to destroy the duckling without affecting its 
body. In addition, they extended their idea by allowing the duckling to connect to other peers and 
other mothers in addition to their original mother and to give a duckling the ability to send orders 
to other ducklings. This, however, will lead to more complex situations. They introduced a two-
level policy to solve the problem, the mother policy and the duckling policy. The mother has the 
control and edits the duckling (device) policy and also can delegate her control to another mother, 
but the duckling decides what certification must be shown to perform a specific task. The 
proposed security policy model (Resurrecting Duckling policy model) can be used to solve the 
problem of "secure transient association” and can reduce the risks of such a system. 
 
Creese et al. [34] indicated that the traditional concepts of entity authentication are inappropriate 
to pervasive computing environments and presented their view on how to modify and change 
these notions to solve many problems in such an environment. They argued that the contextual 
attributes such as location and manufacturer’s certificates should be valid to establish an accurate 
level of assurance. Their work focused on establishing trust as opposed to handling dynamically 
changing permissions. They stated that unlike traditional authentication which is based on 
password, token, biometric and public key encryption, in pervasive computing environments 
there is no need for pre-existing list of trusted parities. The trustworthiness is based on the device 
attributes such as location and human contact not on identity. Moreover, in order to create a good 
basis for trust (assurance) one should have sufficient evidence of legitimacy of the devices (such 
as knowing the vendor and the manufacturer). They argued the need for a flexible and dynamic 
security policy for the pervasive environment and invented a metric graph for comparing 
authentication sets of attributes and to help making decisions based on a suitable policy. Zia et al. 
[3] gave a special significance to the need of risk management which compromises threat 
analysis. They qualified their claim on the basis of the wide flexibility in the interconnection 
between many different devices and how this may be achieved through context-based access 
control mechanisms. In traditional computer access control, access privileges are based on the 
user’s identity and a pre-defined list of access controls (ACL) outlining a certain authority to the 
user. In contrast, in pervasive computing environments authorisation is not based on identity only, 
which then reflects the user’s requirements to use a specific service. This is a result of the wide 
spread use of context-based devices. Their objective was to formulate a practical risk 
management technique in environments, where services are accessible to and consumed by 
processes in order to perform business needs. This technique is different from a risk prevention 
methodology which causes limited interactions and will in turn decrease business effectiveness. 
Thus various risk models may be adopted by individual risk owners according to their risk 
appetite. These result in differing levels of security and communication and therefore business 
process efficiency. As outlined before, authentication is crucial to pervasive systems because 
devices may communicate with untrusted or unknown entities. Designing a standard 
authentication process in a pervasive environment where devices have mobility and transparent 
interaction with users would be difficult to implement. Therefore Li et al. [35], proposed an 
authentication protocol for secure use of public information  within such an environment but 
without the need to access a trusted third party (TTP). Their protocol can prevent the passive (just 
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listening) and active (with control to modify and drop data) attacks, by establishing a new PKI 
and new signature scheme. The proposed protocol can be implemented using symmetric or 
asymmetric cryptography algorithms. They identified the main properties which should be 
provided in an authentication protocol that makes use of the public utilities as: 
 
• Entity authentication which means the user should check which utility they are 
interacting with; 
• Data confidentiality which means the user should be certain that the transmitted 
information should be encrypted so that no attacker (passive or active) can reveal the 
information. 
 
Garzonis et al. [36] stated that in user interaction the most important issue of security is the 
identification and authentication which means asking the user to enter his/her user name and 
password. However, in pervasive environments, identification and authentication using a user-
remembered password raises the problem of usability and vulnerability to attacks. Moreover, in 
traditional network security the process of identification and authentication can be done using 
some identification information such as the IP address of the user’s device. However, in pervasive 
environments the user is expected to use many devices in different networks, requiring a new 
method to identify the user instead of relying on the device being used. The researchers proposed 
a mixture of embedded biometrics and the use of IPv6 header extensions for the interaction 
between network and human, rather than computing devices. This scheme can provide a 
personalized interaction and secure identification procedure for the user according to their 
preferences. By using biometrics systems the re-authentication process can be done without the 
need for the user’s interference and without the need for entering a password. Therefore, re-
authentication using biometric systems can solve this problem, by making the user information as 
part of each data packet leaving the device. For that reason, they used IPv6, which includes a 
header extension known as an “option mechanism”. IPv6 options are placed in separate extension 
headers that are located between the IPv6 header and the transport-layer header in a packet [37]. 
Most IPv6 extension headers are not examined or processed by any router along a packet's 
delivery path until the packet arrives at its final destination. For this reason and others, IPv6 
options may be used to include authentication and security encapsulation options; such options 
were not possible in IPv4. A good example of this is the insertion of biometric systems as 
authentication of information to link information to users. They also showed that this mechanism 
can provide a level of support for context awareness by carrying information about the device 
being used and the characteristics of the user. This information will remove the need for 
transmitting contextual information separately, and changes to the context will be updated 
dynamically through this network protocol. The main idea of the combination of their research is 
to decrease the inverse relationship between security and usability and allow the user to perform 
secure activities in this environment without effecting users’ privacy.  
 
The research in [38] argued that due to the characteristics of pervasive computing environments 
there is a challenge in asserting the user’s identity. In such environments, it is impractical for 
users to prove their identities (through authentication) every time they cross or move among 
various networks. So, to reduce the burden of frequent user authentication and verify user identity 
with a level of certainty, an approach is required for verifying the user identity when interacting 
within a smart environment. The authors suggested developing a new non-intrusive and adaptable 
technique for asserting the user identity. The proposed system called Non-Intrusive Assertion 
System (NIAS) becomes aware of the user’s intention and behaviour while attempting to verify 
their identity and maintaining confidence on the identity of the user. NIAS has the ability to 
monitoring certain aspects of the user’s behaviour.. The system then uses the user behaviour, 
assert the user’s identity. 
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Most authors argued that conventional security techniques are insufficient to securely establish 
the identity of users in pervasive computing environments. Some research has presented modified 
techniques such as the use of contextual attributes, recommendation from a trusted third party 
(TTP), or a combination of IPv6 and embedded biometric systems. In our opinion, establishing 
the identity of a user that interacts with the environment remains a crucial part of the overall 
security provisioning in pervasive environments. As these environments dynamically change their 
behaviour according to the current situation of the user (which is known as context), it is essential 
that the environment would identify its users securely and reliably. Furthermore, using a 
password-based security mechanism (or any other mechanism that depends on direct response 
from the user) to identify the user is proven to cause a usability problem, and may reduce the 
overall flexibility and workability of the environment. However, users, as well as devices, need to 
be assured that identity is securely established and not mistaken with someone else’s before any 
meaningful communication can take place between the user and the environment. We believe that 
identification of users in such environments will remain as an open research issue over the next 
few years, which will attract a lot of attention among the research community in this area. We 
also believe that this issue poses further challenges to the adoption of such environments, similar 
to those that are posed by privacy. For example, in a medical environment, it is paramount that 
users are given enough assurance that the identity of patients is securely maintained at all times 
and not mistaken with other patients’ identity.  
 
6. Comparison between Traditional Computing and Pervasive 
Computing  
 
As discussed in the previous sections, there are numerous differences when considering security 
related issues in the design of pervasive and traditional computing systems. We believe that it is 
important to highlight the differences between the two types of system, as this will make it easier 
for researchers to appreciate the corresponding requirements. Tables 1 to 5 summarise these 
differences with respect to a number of criteria; in each criterion a number of differences may be 
found. The tables use the following categories for the purpose of comparison: 
 
1. User Interaction: This criterion compares issues related to the relationship and interaction 
between the user and the computing devices, how connection is established between 
networked devices and risk management when associating users to devices. See table 1 
2. Access control: This criterion compares issues related to controlling access to resources, 
authorisation procedures, policies and security architectures. See table 2 
3. Trust: This criterion compares issues related to how trust relationships are established, the 
role and nature of trust relationships and the complexity of such relationships. See table 3. 
4. Privacy:  This criterion compares issues related to users’ perception and confidence in the 
way their information is stored and exchanged. It also compares issues related to the degree 
of risk in compromising the privacy of user information. See table 4. 
5. Identity: This criterion compares issues related to the way the user identity is established 
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Table 1. Comparison between Traditional and Pervasive Computing Environments with respect to User 
Interaction  
 




 In traditional systems, the user’s 
intervention is considered 
necessary for initiating the 
connection to a specific device 
within a network. 
 In pervasive systems devices will be connected 
automatically to a network without the users’ 
participation. The devices will initiate the connection 
for them and the users don’t need to know which 
network they have accessed [39]. 
 Traditional network systems have 
a well defined process for risk 
assessment and procedures. 
 In pervasive systems more flexible and varying risk 
assessment process is needed, due to the unpredictable 
and highly distributed interaction [1]. 
 In traditional systems, standard 
authentication protocols such as 
Kerberos, IPSec, and SSL, are 
used for controlling access to 
network resources. 
 Standard authentication protocols cannot be readily used in 
pervasive system environments, because they cannot 
provide the required mobility and scalability needed in 
such environments [24].  
  The computing model is based on 
localised desktop devices, where 
there is one–to–one relationship 
between the machine and user. 
 Computing is highly distributed into the surroundings 
and onto the user’s personal digital devices. There is a 
many–to-one relationship between the machine and 
user [1][40]. 
  The desktop devices are fully 
controlled by the user. 
 The user has less control on the device actions. 
 
  The user is conscious about the 
interaction with the desktop 
devices, where all information 
supplied by the user is under full 
control of the user at all times. 
 The 
user is unconscious about the interaction with many 
devices (the number of devices may not be known) 
and the connection between these devices will be 
unknown. The user is unaware of what information is 
sent to what device at any particular point in time [9]. 
 








 Access to resources can be done by 
knowing the identity of a device such as its 
IP address or MAC address. 
 The user needs the ability to access any resource 
and service at any time from any place without a 
need to know the identity of the device [1]. 
 Traditional authorisation or access 
privileges have been based on the user’s 
identity, where a pre-defined list of 
identities is maintained for authorised 
access to a resource or service. Using the 
identity, the system issues a ticket 
detailing authorisation for accessing 
resources on the network. 
• User identity alone is insufficient to control 
access to resources and services. A more 
sophisticated access control mechanism is 
needed to grant access based on user identity, 
context and behaviour. This is due to the nature 
of the environment where users’ needs are more 
dynamic and the services are constantly 
changing [25]. 
 Security architecture in traditional 
computing systems involves using 
firewalls to restrict the access to network 
resources. 
 Using firewalls in pervasive computing will not 
be effective because the network architecture is 
more complex, and may comprise multiple 
domains. This may require installing firewall 
software within each device [41]. 
 Traditional security architectures use 
centralized authorization servers to grant a 
 In pervasive computing systems, more 
distributed security architectures are needed, 
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user access to a resource within the 
network. 
such as keeping uniform security policies across 
the distributed components of the architecture 
[23]. 
 Security policies are usually static which 
are typically based on layer 3 or 4 
information. 
 Dynamic policies, that take into consideration 
the privacy of the user’s sensitive information, 
are required because of the flexibility of using 
many different devices which might work in 
different networks. Moreover, both the devices 
and applications will be constrained by the limits 
of available resources such as communication 
capabilities, computation and storage [42]. 
 
Table 3. Comparison between Traditional and Pervasive Computing Environments with respect to Trust 
 
Criterion Traditional Computer Networks Pervasive Computing Environments 
Trust  In traditional networks, trust relationships are 
established based on identity, recommendation 
from third trusted party (TTP) or reputation.  
 In pervasive computing, trust relationships 
are established using the identity of a user 
and their context information (behaviour 
and attributes) [26]. 
 
 Trust in traditional systems is a means for 
controlling access to resources. 
 In pervasive environments, trust is more a 
general term as it also includes a measure of 
how accurate the information is. 
 Trust relationships in traditional systems are 
static in nature; once the relationship is formed 
between the trustor and trustee, it remains 
valid until it is broken explicitly by the trustor. 
 In pervasive systems, the relationship is 
more dynamic and based on historical 
information and risk assessment. Every time 
a device requires access to a resource, the 
trust relationship is re-assessed according to 
the device’s current and previous status. 
 In traditional systems, trust relationships are 
simple, and include two parties: trustor and 
trustee. 
 In pervasive systems, more complex 
relationships may be formed by delegating 
trust from one user to another to form a 
chain of trust relationships [26]. 
 
Table 4. Comparison between Traditional and Pervasive Computing Environments with respect to Privacy 
 
Criterion Traditional Computer Networks Pervasive Computing Environments 
Privacy  In traditional networks, privacy is less 
problematic as despite people are concerned 
about holding and storing their personal 
information, they know where this information 
is stored and used. 
 In pervasive computing environments, 
privacy is more significant, for people are 
less willing to exchange their personal 
information with the environment. This is 
because they are unaware or unsure where 
their information being held and used [1]. 
 There is a lower risk in storing personal 
information on traditional networks, as they 
can only be accessed by authorized users. 
 There is a higher risk involved in storing 
personal information on pervasive and 
mobile systems, as they may be accessed 
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Table 5. Comparison between Traditional and Pervasive Computing Environments with respect to Identity 
Criterion Traditional Computer Networks Pervasive Computing Environments 
Identity  In traditional systems, the user identity is 
established and verified by using the common 
authentication methods, such as checking a 
password, swiping a smartcard, or other means 
of proving that the user is who they claim to 
be.  
 In pervasive computing environments, more 
subtle ways are required to establish the user 
identity, because common authentication 
protocols may not be adequate [24]. 
 The risk of identity theft is mainly linked to 
stealing a password or credentials which an 
attacker will use to impersonate someone else.  
 The risk of identity theft is higher in 
pervasive computing because there is a 
higher risk of losing the user’s device; such 
as PDA or a mobile phone, where identity is 
normally stored.  
 
8.Future Research Directions 
 
In this section, we explore the directions and topics of research related to privacy, trust and user 
identity in pervasive computing environments. 
 
8.1 Research Directions Related to Privacy in Pervasive Computing Environments 
 
Privacy is an important issue within pervasive computing, as people become concerned when 
they are unaware where their personal information is being saved, by whom and for what purpose 
it would be used. To address these concerns, possible research areas in this direction are 
highlighted below.  These areas will provide users with greater confidence about the way in 
which their information is being utilised when interacting with pervasive computing 
environments. 
 
• Investigating and developing new privacy architectures which can measure how much of 
the user’s personal information should be given and determine which part of this 
information needs to be collected by the environment for a particular purpose. These 
architectures will provide users in pervasive environments with greater control in the way 
in which their information is being exchanged. 
• Extensions of the anonymity and pseudonymity concepts to prevent the leakage of 
personal information in pervasive environments. Such extensions will protect the users’ 
privacy and provide them with flexibility by giving the rights to users to choose whether 
to distribute and exchange their personal data or not. One possible extension is to provide 
multiple levels of anonymity, in which the users could make informed choice as a trade-
off between privacy and functionality. 
• Designing abstraction models and policy languages to control privacy management. Such 
models can be implemented by extending Langheinrich’s principles [9], which are: 
Notice, Choice and Consent, Proximity and Locality, Anonymity and Pseudonymity, 
Security and Access and Recourse. New models and languages are needed to enable 
designers to easily define policies for managing user privacy based on these policies. 
• Developing privacy policies for the exchange of personal information based on 
interpreting and abstracting users’ contextual information. Contextual information may be 
used to provide insight to the system for deciding which parts of the user information is 
needed (for a specific functionality) and hence retrieve the relevant information without 
having to exchange the irrelevant parts. Research would be needed to define dynamic 
policies for this purpose. 
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8.2 Research Directions Related to Trust in Pervasive Computing Environments 
 
Because of the dynamic nature of pervasive computing environments, forming trust relationships 
presents a challenge to designers. To overcome such a challenge possible research topics include: 
 
• Designing distributed flexible and dynamic trust architectures which have security 
policies that could focus on providing more control over the access of services. These 
architectures will be capable of supporting, forming and maintaining trust relationships 
dynamically.  
• Designing adaptable protocols which should maintain a high scale of user mobility in 
pervasive environments. These protocols should have the ability to exploit localized trust 
establishment and decision making. 
 
 
8.3 Research Directions Related to Identity in Pervasive Computing  
 
Establishing user identity within pervasive computing environments requires innovative methods 
for authenticating users which take into consideration the dynamic and mobile nature of such 
environments. To deal with this issue, possible research topics include: 
 
• Implementing new techniques to provide non-intrusive mechanisms to authenticate users 
as they interact with a huge number of entities in pervasive computing environments. 
Such approaches would shift users away from the classical intrusive techniques in 
traditional network systems (for example, entering a password) towards non-intrusive 
techniques. In addition, such approaches will help achieve a balance between security and 
usability. 
• Designing new architectures and protocols which can cope with changing identity across 
different domains. As users in pervasive environments have many interactions with 
various devices and applications, research is needed for designing new architectures and 
protocols to manage multiple identities of users as they cross domain boundaries.  
• Developing new adaptable protocols and models for sensing, gathering and filtering user 
contextual information. Acquiring contextual information such as user’s activity or 
behaviour will help in verifying the correct identity. These protocols need to support 
multiple personas (characters) of a single user in pervasive computing domains and 
maintain the objectives of pervasive computing in creating seamless environments and 
delivering distributed services. In meeting such adaptable protocols and models, this will 




This paper has reviewed a number of technical challenges related to designing secure pervasive 
systems and compared them to more traditional computing environments. A number of research 
papers have been reviewed to cover various challenges and technological advances in the subject. 
The major differences between traditional computer networks and pervasive computing 
environments have been highlighted. In pervasive environments, issues related to assessing 
resources are similar to peer-to-peer communication issues. Users in such environments will have 
the ability to gain access to any resource/service at anytime from anywhere. This fact will result 
in serious implications since devices are constantly interacting with other devices outside their 
(home) environments. This new smart world will bring many differences in comparison with 
recent traditional computer systems. Generally, policing resources in traditional computing 
systems means using firewalls for access control, static policies, and tendency to focus on 
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network layers and static risk assessments. While in pervasive computing systems, access control 
is based on using authentication, identity management and trust because such systems are more 
distributed, dynamic and have a high risk as users’ personal information would be accessed from 
anywhere by anyone. 
 
We believe that authentication in a pervasive computing environment should be considered as the 
first stepping stone, because it is important to reliably establish the identity of the user in such 
environments. We also believe that authentication requires the development of new techniques 
and policy systems that also take into account the user’s contextual information. 
 
Privacy, trust, and identity are highlighted as the main considerations in the design of pervasive 
environments in comparison to more traditional computing systems. It is vital to provide solutions 
for these issues in pervasive computing in order to be truly beneficial and socially acceptable and 
for the users to take part comfortably within such trustworthy environment. Privacy is a major 
challenge in pervasive computing when compared to traditional computing systems. For that 
reason, a number of proposed solutions have used concepts such as anonymity and pseudonymity 
which can also imply trust, to prevent the leakage of personal information. Trust allows a greater 
flexibility in designing security policies and providing more control over the accessed services. 
Trust relationships are mainly established using context information such as the behaviour and 
attributes of a user. When a user establishes more than one connection with different devices, 
each connection needs a verification process. The aim of the verification process is to confirm 
precisely the identity of the person and enable the pervasive system to cope with a stolen identity. 
Different approaches have been surveyed in the identity section. It is apparent that acquiring 
contextual information about a user and saving them as history could be used to authenticate the 
user and will help in verifying the correct identity. However, the verification process is still prone 
to security attacks as it is exposed to more devices and external networks.  
 
Many research papers in pervasive environments pay attention to the risk involved in user 
identification and authentication; this makes identity and trust in such environments very closely 
related. Establishing user identity requires a measure of trust (accuracy) in the process of 
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